Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.
I’m trying to figure out the difference between a love of concupiscence and one of friendship. As St. Thomas lays it out in I-II q.26 something we want good things for is loved by the love of concupiscence while the good things we want for him are loved by a love of friendship.
On the surface, this looks like a pretty straightforward claim: when I want by friend to be healthy, I love my friend by the love of friendship and health (an his having health?) by the love of concupiscence. Similarly, when I want myself to be happy, I love myself with a love like that of friendship, while my own health with one of concupiscence. But, if I consider a bonum honestum (wisdom, for example) seems to lead to problems since by this account, since I cannot want good for wisdom, it seems necessary to say that I love wisdom by a love of concupiscence and not a love of friendship. To love wisdom in that way, however, seems unfitting since the good loved by love of concupiscence is a god ordered to the good of another, while wisdom is a good sought for its own sake.
I’m not sure how to get out of this difficulty. Do I have to concede the reductio and say that we wish good things for wisdom (perhaps this could be supported by saying that to love wisdom is to love God under the notion of wisdom)? Do I have to distinguish how something is loved for its own sake?