1. Two accounts of good’s nature—Quod omnia appetunt (NE I.1)
    • Hobbes

      Omnibus rebus, quae appetuntur, quatenus appetuntur, nomen commune est bonum; et rebus omnibus, quas fugimus, malum. Itaque bonum bene definivit Aristoteles, illud esse quod omnes appetunt… Bonum commune esse potest, et recte dici de re aliqua, communiter bonum est, id est, multis utile, vel civitati bonum… itaque simpliciter bonum dici non potest; cum quicquid bonum est, bonum sit aliquibus vel alicui. Bona erant ab initio omnia quae creavit Deus. Quare? Quia ipsi opera sua omnia placuere… Bonum ergo relative dicitur ad personam, ad locum, et ad tempus. Huic hic, nunc, placet; illi, illic, tunc, displicet: et sic de circumstantiis caeteris. Natura enim boni et mali sequitur rerum συντυχίαν.

      • Quod omnia appetunt
      • Ergo, bonum quia appetitur
      • Ergo, bonum est relative, non absolute
        • Natura enim boni et mali sequitur rerum συντυχίαν (casos)
    • John of St. Thomas re. Hobbes’ view:

      Ratio vero est, quia alioqin istae passiones in suo essentiali conceptu essent nhil, seu aliquid fictum nec realiter convenirent enti, quia quod in se nonn est realiter, in se est nihil, et sic ens realiter non esset bonum, neque verum, quia verum in re nihil esset sed aliquid fictum. Ens autem quod realiter non est verum, sed ficte, est ens rationis et nohil, et quod in re non est bonum, non appetitur, ut realiter bonum, sed phantastice, et ficte, quae omnia absurda sunt.

      • Note that John of St. Thomas’ insistence that the thing is as really good, Hobbes’ view in which the Good is nothing in the thing undermines the very notion of Good since the desire becomes a desire for something ficta, made up.
    • St. Thomas
      • In the Summa Theologiae (Ia V.1), the relation of this to being is brought about by argument through perfection:
        • Good is what all things desire
          • is it different to say that “Good is what ‘each’ thing desires?”
          • is it different to say that “Good is what ‘every’ thing desires?”
        • All things desire their own perfection
        • Each thing’s perfection is according to its actuality
        • Each thing is in act according to its existence
        • Each thing is good insofar as it exists
      • Perfectivum alterius per modum finis (De Veritate)
        • From the previous argument we can gather that “the good is what all things desire insofar as they desire their own perfection”
        • Thus the good is something which perfects the one who desires it
        • Consequently, the good is perfective of another – But it is perfective of another as desired, that is as an end
        • Thus the good is perfective of another by way of end.

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